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1 
1 Introduction 
Discussions of monetary policy in recent years invariably make reference to the "Taylor 
rule". This is a simple rule suggested by Taylor (1993) in which the federal funds rate is set 
with reference to a linear function of U.S. inflation and the output gap and which 
accurately described Federal Reserve policy during the period considered by Taylor; i.e. 
1987q1-1992q3. Its simplicity has meant that it has since been widely used as a benchmark 
against which policy decisions have been judged and its properties as a rule for policy-
making have been thoroughly investigated in the context of various macroeconomic 
models (notably in Woodford, 2003).1 There have also been numerous empirical exercises 
investigating the extent to which Taylor's original finding that the rule describes Federal 
Reserve behaviour extends to other data periods. Orphanides (2003) in particular consid-
ers whether the Taylor rule can be used as an organising device with which to characterise 
U.S. monetary policy, concluding that policy since the early 1950's, and indeed before, can 
be readily interpreted within this framework. 
Interest in estimating Taylor rules does not necessarily arise from a desire to expose an 
actual rule that was used in formulating policy. Rather the Taylor rule framework can be 
used to characterise past decision-making and to impose a useful structure for drawing 
inferences about changes in the systematic reaction of monetary policy to economic con-
ditions. But there remains considerable structural uncertainty even within a Taylor rule 
framework. Specifically, there is "specification, uncertainty" relating to the precise form of the 
Taylor rule to be estimated. For example, the choice of model can vary according to the 
horizon over which policy-makers consider their decisions since they might focus on 
recently-experienced inflation and business cycle fluctuations or on expected future 
outcomes. The choice of model can also vary according to the degree of interest rate 
smoothing allowed, the chosen measure of inflation (including or excluding asset prices, 
say) and the chosen measure of the output gap.2 There is also uncertainty about the sta, 
1The work of Woodford provides a justification for the use of the Taylor rule framework by relating the 
rule to the underlying payoffs (utility and welfare), choices and beliefs that might hold in the economy. 
2See Kozicki (1999) for discussion of various forms of specification uncertainty in monetary policy 
decisions, and Orphanides and van Norden (2003) and Garratt et al. (2008, 2009) for detailed discussion 
[1] 
bility of the policy responses to economic conditions; that is, "regime uncertainty" . There 
have been considerable changes over the decades in policy-makers' understanding of the 
operation of the macroeconomy and in the perceived payoffs from policy interventions. 
This translates into changes in policy regime, sometimes occurring abruptly with the ap-
pointment of a new Federal Reserve Chairman and sometimes involving an evolution of 
policy as priorities and beliefs change.' This potential for structural instability generates 
uncertainty about the relevance of past interest rate decisions to current decisions and 
about the choice of the sampling window in empirical work. An analysis that accommo-
dates and characterises these two forms of structural uncertainty would extend traditional 
Taylor rule analysis, which is typically only concerned about inferences based on the es-
timated responsiveness of the interest rate to inflation and the gap within a particular 
model (i.e. relating to "parameter uncertainty") and on the fit of the model (i.e. relating to 
the residual "stochastic uncertainty"). 
This paper provides a characterisation of U.S. monetary policy based on a novel and 
pragmatic modelling approach which accommodates specification and regime uncertainties 
as well as the parameter and stochastic uncertainties in traditional Taylor rule analysis. This 
approach involves estimation and inference based on a set of specific Taylor rules obtained 
through linear regression methods, but combined using Bayesian model averaging 
techniques. The Taylor rule is a vehicle for characterising past interest rate decisions and the 
weights employed in combining individual Taylor rules to obtain the 'meta' rule are 
determined according to the ability of the individual rules to explain past interest rate 
movements.4 The weights can change over time so that the approach is very flexible, 
of appropriate measures of the output gap. As discussed below, when the data is published only with a 
delay or is subject to revision, these measurement problems are compounded by the need to consider the 
data that is available in real-time. 
3See, for example, Cogley and Sargent's (2005) study of the extent to which postwar US inflation can 
be explained by changes in policy-makers' understanding of the processes determining inflation and the 
likely consequences of policy actions. 
4Typically, 'meta' analysis averages estimates of interest across different studies. However, the settings 
are too disparate in past studies of U.S. monetary policy to make this practicable. Thus, we recreate 'meta' 
analysis by averaging estimates across a range of model specifications and sample periods considered in 
past studies, but otherwise controlling the setting in terms of variables, data, and general structure. 
[2] 
even compared to more computationally-demanding time-varying parameter models of 
Taylor rules (e.g., Boivin, 2005; Kim and Nelson, 2006; Kim, Kishor, and Nelson, 2006; 
McCulloch, 2007; Alcidi, Flamini, and Fracasso, 2011), and could be usefully applied to 
investigate many behavioural relations in economics. As we shall see, the estimated meta 
Taylor rule is able to capture many of the changes in the reaction of monetary policy to 
economic conditions over the last forty years, while still providing a compelling charac-
terisation of monetary policy decision-making in a single coherent and simple modelling 
framework. Section 2 of the paper formalises the modelling approach taken to estimate the 
meta Taylor rule and relates the approach to the relevant model selection and Bayesian 
literature. Section 3 presents the results of the estimation of the U.S. meta Taylor rule over 
the period 1972q1 — 2008q4, highlighting phases of policy in which anti-inflationary policy 
was pursued more or less aggressively, when fear of recession or overheating dominated 
decisions, and when policy was more or less interventionist. Section 4 concludes. 
2  Structural  Uncerta inty and the Taylor Rule 
2 .1 Taylor Rule Specificat ions  
The rule reported in Taylor (1993) relates the federal funds rate in time t, rt, to the rate of 
change of the implicit output deflator over the previous four quarters, 71t, and a measure 
of the output gap at t, xt, as follows: 
rt Yo + "'fir fft+ + Et, (2.1) 
 t = 198781, T, and T = 199283. 
In Taylor's paper, the parameters of interest were taken to be 'To = 1, = 1.5, 'Yx = 0.5 
but many subsequent papers have estimated rules of the form (2.1) where et represents the 
deviations from the rule characterising policy in a given quarter assumed to have 
(unconditional) mean zero and variance 62. Note that here, T±ixt is a measure of the output 
gap in time t as made available at time T+ 1 and introduces the distinction between the 
measure of the gap that was available to Taylor when he undertook the analysis in 1992q4, 
i.e. T+ixt, and the measure that would have been available in real time, i.e. txt. 
[3] 
Orphanides (2001) provides a detailed analysis of the Taylor rule when estimated over the 
sample originally used by Taylor but paying attention to this distinction between the real-
time and end-of-sample measures of the gap. He demonstrates that the performance of 
the Taylor rule in capturing interest rate movements is considerably reduced when the 
real-time measures are used and urges policy makers to take this informational issue into 
account when using simple rules in decision-making. We find this to be a persuasive 
argument and make the real-time dimension of the analysis explicit in all that follows. 
Orphanides' (2001) analysis also raises the issue of whether, in practice, policy-makers 
are as myopic as is suggested by the rule of (2.1) where only contemporaneous measures 
of inflation and the gap are assumed to influence interest rate decisions. He considers the 
possibility that policy-makers are forward-looking and estimates alternative Taylor rules 
using direct measures of expected future inflation and the expected future gap, art_Fi and 
ixt+i, i = 1, .., 4, in place of the contemporaneous values. The direct measures are the 
expected inflation data and the Federal Reserve staff estimates of the gap based on 
potential output as published in the Greenbook. Again focusing on Taylor's original 
sample (and also using the slightly extended sample 1987q1 — 19930 used in Taylor, 
1994), Orphanides shows that very different parameter estimates are obtained in the 
alternative rules based on these different policy-horizons, establishing that the uncertainty 
surrounding the policy-horizon is empirically important. 
Analysis of monetary policy should accommodate the model uncertainty surrounding 
the policy horizon but it also should address the possibility of changes in policy regime if 
the analysis is to span a reasonably long data period. There has been considerable debate 
on the different approaches to monetary policy formulation taken by successive Federal 
Reserve Chairmen over the years (see, for example, Romer and Romer, 2004) and the 
extent to which these pursued more or less active counter-inflationary policies. To the 
extent that there has been variation in policy approaches, it should be reflected 
by different values for the -yo, and o parameters in Taylor rule models estimated 
at different times. However, unless there is a clear-cut break in regime, at precisely the time 
of a change of the Fed Chairmanship for example, there will be uncertainty on the sample 
periods relevant for estimating the different rules that describe policy-making over 
[4] 
a protracted period. Indeed, the regime uncertainty surrounding the choice of sample might 
interact with the specification uncertainty surrounding the choice of policy horizon if, for 
example, new regimes behave cautiously at first, focusing on contemporaneous or short-
horizon outcomes, and become more forward-looking over time if the policy is seen to 
succeed and credibility is established.
5
 
The structural uncertainties discussed above can be accommodated within a set of 
Taylor rule models MiiT each distinguished according to the policy horizon, i, and the 
sample period for which the model is relevant (T—j,...,T). Taking a real-time perspective, T 
here denotes the final observation in the sample available at the time an interest rate 
decision is made. The set of models characterising interest rate determination over the 
period T1, ..., Tr, is given by 
MUT Tt = PUT Tt-1 + (1 PijT) (MUT 'YirUT t7 t±i 'YzUT tSt+i) + iiTi(2.2) 
where i = = /min, •••,imax, 
t = T — j,...,T, and T = • •,Tn, 
and eiiTt are i.i.d. innovations with mean zero and standard deviation o
-
iiT. All of the 
models take the Taylor rule form of (2.1) extended to allow for interest rate smoothing. In 
any model, the policy horizon considered by the decision-maker is assumed to look back 
one quarter or to look forwards for up to one year (i = —1, ..., 4). The models are also 
distinguished by the time span over which a rule is assumed to have operated, considered 
here to be in operation for j periods ending in period T; i.e. j is a duration measure 
describing the age of the regime. Of course, when there is a break, the regime period starts 
afresh so that jmin = 1 although, in practice, the choice of minimum regime length will be 
driven by the need to have enough observations for estimation purposes (so that we might 
choose jrnir, = 16, say). The maximum period for the survival of an unchanged policy 
stance is, in principle, unlimited. In practice in the U.S., though, there have been six 
Federal Reserve Chairmen since the mid-sixties so that, in the absence of any other 
information, one might anticipate that there would be breaks every six or seven years and 
5See Pesaran and Timmerman (1995) and Elliott and Timmerman (2008) for discussion of uncertainty over 
model instability in the context of forecasting. 
[5] 
that a given policy rule would not last longer than ten years i.e. jn,„ = 40, say. 2.2 
The Meta Taylor Rule and Model Averaging 
The considerable structural uncertainty surrounding interest rate determination is reflected 
by the idea that the interest rate observed at a particular moment T could be explained by 
any of 6 x 25 = 150 different models according to (2.2) if we set jrnin = 16 and jr„,.), = 40.6 
The meta Taylor rule proposed here accommodates this uncertainty by using a weighted 
average of the models in (2.2). Model averaging is now in widespread use in forecasting but 
is much less widely employed in structural modelling even though the statistical arguments 
to support the approach are equally valid in inference and prediction. 
The foundation of the approach is the Bayesian Modelling Average (BMA) formula 
(see Draper, 1995 or Hoeting et al, 1999): 
 4 40 
Pr(OT ZT) = E E Pr(OT MijT, ZT) X Pr(MtiT ZT) 
j=16 
(2.3) 
where OT represents the unknown responsiveness of interest rates in time T to inflation 
and the output gap, reflected by the parameters (p, -yo, -yx) in the Taylor rule form; 
where ZT = (Zi, ...ZT) represents the data available at T with zt rt, t7rt+i, tXt+i V i); 
and where Pr(OT I ZT) is the inferential distribution that describes our understanding of 
the parameters of interest. The BMA formula deals with the structural uncertainty 
accommodated within Pr(OT ZT) by decomposing it into a weighted average of the 
conditional distributions (i.e. conditional on a specific model), Pr(OT I AftiT, ZT), using 
as weights the posterior model probabilities Pr(Mijr ZT). 
2.2.1 The conditional distributions 
A typical Taylor rule analysis considers the first element on the right-hand side of (2.3) 
only, working with a specific model (say M*) and making inference that takes into account 
60f course, estimation of these separate models would also expose the parameter uncertainty surrounding 
the estimates of Pi3T, 70i1T3 7/rijT, and 7.0T, and the stochastic uncertainty surrounding the estimated EijT,t 
as considered in standard Taylor rule estimation exercises. 
[6] 
the stochastic and parameter uncertainties surrounding this specific model, noting that  
Pr(BT I M*, ZT) = f Pr(OT M*, 0, ZT)Pr(0 I M*, ZT) de .  
As Pr(O M*, ZT) oc Pr(ZT M*, 8)/ Pr(13 M*), a strict Bayesian approach to evaluating this 
distribution requires a prior position to be taken on the the likely value of the parameters 
in the specified model. Alternatively, the conditional inferential distribution can be 
approximated using the maximum likelihood estimator of the parameters in M* and its 
associated density. Specifically, in the case of a standard linear regression model, we have 
(O*7, — 6T I M*1ZT) N N(0, V;,) where 49;, and V4', denote the ML estimator and its 
estimation variance respectively. Although OT is taken as fixed at the estimation stage, it 
can be viewed as a random variable at the inference stage, so that Pr(OT M*, ZT) is 
approximated by N(O*T, \%) and standard inference carried out. Moreover, this 
simplification can be made for any model so that we can look at all 150 of our models of 
interest and base Pr(OT MijT, ZT) on the models' maximum likelihood estimates. 
2 .2.2 The model weights  
The meta Taylor rule accommodates specification and instability uncertainty in (2.3) 
through the use of the model weights. Further application of the Bayes rule provides 
Pr(MiiT) Pr(ZT I MiiT) 
Pr(Mijr I ZT) = 
Er Eq Pr(MpqT) Pr(ZT I MpqT) 
where Pr(MiiT) is the prior probability of model AlijT and Pr(ZT I Mi.IT) is the integrated 
likelihood which can itself be decomposed into elements involving the prior probability on 
OijT given the model MiiT. Again, a strict Bayesian approach to estimation of the meta rule 
therefore involves the specification of meaningful prior probabilities on the models of 
interest and on the associated parameters. Alternatively, in the forecasting literature, simple 
averaging (using equal weights) or weights based on the models' likelihoods or their 
information criteria have been proposed as a way of accommodating the structural 
uncertainty and have been shown to improve forecasting performance considerably (see, for 
example, Garratt et al., 2003, or Elliott and Timmermann, 2008, for discussion). 
Given our modelling context, where there is uncertainty on the period over which any 
model is relevant due to the possibility of regime change, another sensible set of 
[7] 
weights might be chosen by allowing these to evolve over time, recursively updating a model's 
weight to reflect the extent to which it remains useful for sample periods up to T =T1,..,Tn. 
Specifically, we can write 
Pr(MijT ZT-1, ZT) 
Pr(zT I Mig., ZT-1) *Pr(MiiT I ZT-i.) (2.4) 
4 40 
r k z r  I  f  Z T _ i ) *  E E  p ro f ,  I  mk , , , , zT_o*pr ( l k i , i  Z T -
1 )  P r ( z r  
k=-1 1=16 
so that a model's weight in period T depends on two things: the probability or density of the 
final observation in the sample conditional on the model, and the likelihood of the model 
given data up to T — 1. For the first of these, we note that under standard normality 
assumptions on the residuals for a model, the log density of the final observation is 
proportional to the value of the squared residual in period T. For the second element, we 
note that the likelihood of the model given data up to T —1 depends, in turn, on the 
weights for all models in T — 1 and on the transition probabilities Pr(M iiT I MkiT_i, ZT-1).7 
A simple structure for the transition probabilities is that, irrespective of the prevailing policy 
regime in the previous period, there is a constant probability of a break in regime in the next 
period, A, and that, if there is a break, the new regime uses a Taylor rule with policy horizon 
i with equal probability for each of the possible policy horizons. 
That is 
   
 
1—A ifi=k,j=i-F1 
 
i.e. if no break 
Pr(Mi,j,T 1 Mk/T-i. ,ZT-1) = A/6 if i = —1, ..., 4, j = 16 i.e. if break to policy horizon i 
 0 otherwise  (2.5) 
 
Taken together then, (2.4) and (2.5) provide a straightforward means for producing a set  
7It is worth noting that, given the same number of parameters for each model and the same initial 
model weights prior to the first sample ending in T1, a weighting scheme based only on squared residuals 
would be equivalent to using the SIC approximation of log marginal likelihoods for BMA under the 
assumption of a fixed policy regime (since a fixed policy regime implies transition probabilities equal to one 
for a given model and the same sample periods for all models in each T). The factorization of the model 
weights into the different elements in (2.4) addresses the different relevant sample periods based on j and 
different transition probabilities for each model given the possibility of policy regime changes. 
[8] 
Pr(MiiT I ZT) = 
of weights for each T = T1, .., Tn.8 This weighting scheme allows new regimes to be 'born' 
in each period and otherwise updates the weights on different models recursively from one 
period to the next to reflect the likelihood that the models remain relevant for the updated 
sample. 
The use of sensibly-chosen model weights for Pr(MiiTIZT) in (2.3), along with the use of 
ML estimation of individual rules, represents a pragmatic approach to accommodating 
structural uncertainty in discussing inference in an estimated Taylor rule which could be 
applied more widely in modelling behavioural relationships in economics. Estimation of the 
individual Taylor rules is based on standard linear regressions of the form found throughout 
the literature. But the combination of these into a meta model accommodates specification 
uncertainty and can capture the effects of complicated structural change. The formula in 
(2.4) constrains the weights to evolve over time according to the models' historical fit. This 
corresponds with the idea discussed earlier, and by Orphanides, that the Taylor rule provides 
a framework for characterising decision-making according to its ability to capture past 
policy outcomes. Moreover, the evolution of the weights itself provides useful information 
with which to interpret the changing policy regime. Also, the weighting scheme allows for 
considerable flexibility in the ways in which the sensitivity of interest rates to inflation and 
the gap can develop; for example, as we shall see in the empirical section below, the 
evolving weights can accommodate periods in which the responsiveness of policy changes 
slowly over time and periods when policy changes abruptly. The approach is more flexible 
than a standard time-varying parameter (TVP) model, for example, in which the form of the 
instability is defined at the outset, while estimation of a more elaborate TVP model that 
allows for more complex forms of instability would be computationally more demanding 
than the meta approach proposed here.
9
 The 'meta' 
8We also need initial weights for the models prior to the first sample period that ends in T1. For simplicity, we 
assume these initial weights are equal, as is standard in BMA. 
9The use of N(WT, V;-.) as an approximation for Pr(OT /14', ZT) is akin to a Bayesian approach with 
non-informative priors for OT. The model averaging allows for a specification of diffuse priors over 
different types of models and parameters. A Bayesian TVP model with comparable flexibility would 
require more informative restrictive priors and would be computationally much more complicated to 
estimate. 
[9] 
approach provides a pragmatic, easy-to-implement and easy-to-interpret means of accom-
modating structural uncertainty therefore. The approach also clearly addresses some of the 
dangers implicit in many model selection algorithms which use the data Zt to identify a single 
preferred choice of M* and then proceed to make inferences as if M* was known to be 
correct.
1
° 
3 The U.S.  Meta Taylor Rule  
In this section, we describe the meta Taylor rule, obtained as a weighted average of the various models described in (2.2), estimated 
using U.S. data for the period 1969q1 
—
2008q4.
11
 Our primary dataset consists of the federal funds rate plus real-time data on 
t7rt+i and tyt+i, i = —1, .., 4. These represent the first-release measures of inflation and 
output (released with a one-period delay) when i = —1, the nowcast of current inflation 
and output as provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) when i = 0, and 
their one-, two-, three- and four-quarter ahead forecasts when i = 1, .., 4. In some of our 
analysis below, we also make use of the Federal Reserve staff estimates of the gap 
between actual and potential output as published in the Greenbook and the GDP gap 
constructed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). For each model, we consider OLS 
estimation because the right-hand-side variables were available to policymakers when 
setting the federal funds rate and, therefore, predetermined. 
Our primary aim is to accommodate in our 'meta' Taylor rule the uncertainty arising from 
the choice of policy horizon and the uncertainty arising from changing policy regimes. For 
most of the analysis, therefore, we abstract from the uncertainties arising from the choice of 
inflation and output gap measures by using simple and readily-available measures of these 
key variables.' Specifically, we use the GDP deflator for inflation and we use 
1°See Draper (1995) for further discussion. 
unreported analysis, we have extended the sample period to include the period after 2008q4 where  
interest rates have been close to their zero-lower-bound. Not surprisingly given the lack of variation in 
the dependent variable, the estimated responses to inflation and the output gap do not change much after 
2008q4, but the confidence bands on these estimates get wider. These results are available from the  
authors upon request. 
12See Garratt, Lee and Shields (2010) for a discussion of a measure of the natural output gap that is  
[10] 
a measure of the gap based on Taylor's original exercise but constructed using real-time 
data only. Taylor's gap measure was calculated as the difference between (log) output and 
a linear trend running through the observations of (log) output series between 198481 —1992q3, where the output data used was the 1992q4 vintage. Clearly this measure would 
not have been available within the sample period and so could not have served as a basis 
of policy decisions in real time." 
Our measure of the gap in each period uses only data available in real time, 
considering the historical output series available up to one quarter earlier (since there is a 
one-quarter delay in publication of output data) plus the output data available from the 
SPF giving direct measures of expected output contemporaneously and up to four 
quarters ahead. This allows the construction of a gap measure for our different policy 
horizons i = —1, .. . 4. The real time output trend values are constructed using a linear 
trend through a rolling sample of 40 quarters of the real time data series (including the 35 
historical and 5 expected observations) and the gap is measured as the difference between 
the expected contemporaneous output value and the value of this trend. The idea is to 
consider a gap measure that is as close as possible to that originally considered by Taylor 
to focus attention on the uncertainties surrounding the policy horizon and regime. Later, 
however, we do use the Federal Reserve's gap measures in an extension to the main 
analysis to gauge the impact of accommodating this further element of uncertainty on the 
estimation of the Taylor rule. 
Figure 1 plots our real-time measure of the output gap from 1969q1-2008q4 and the 
Greenbook/CBO gap that we use in our later analysis for its shorter available sample 
period of 1987q3-2008q4. There is a close correspondence of the two output gap 
measures and of our measure with NBER peak/trough dates, also displayed in the figure. 
calculable in real time and which has an explicit economic motivation. See also Garratt et al. (2008, 2009) 
for a more comprehensive discussion of the characterisation of the output gap when there is uncertainty 
on how the concept is best measured. 
13Orphanides (2001) shows that the gap measure used by Taylor is, by coincidence, relatively close  
to measures that were produced by Federal Reserve staff in real time over this particular time frame so that 
the original Taylor characterisation is robust to the real-time measurement issues for his particular sample 
of data. 
3.1 Taylor Rules for the Taylor Sample, 1987q1 — 1993q4 
Tables 1 and 2 describe a series of Taylor rules estimated over the period 1987q1 — 
1993q4. These illustrate some of the empirical issues involved in estimating Taylor rules 
and provide a point of contact with some estimated rules in the previous literature. The 
tables correspond to Tables 5 and 6 in Orphanides (2001) which also consider this 
(extended Taylor, 1994) sample period using the 1994q4 vintage data and using real-time 
data. The difference between Tables 1 and 2 here and Orphanides' tables is in the measure 
of the gap; Orphanides uses a measure based on the Federal Reserve staff's estimates of 
potential output as reported in the Greenbook while we use the measure based on the 
linear trend described above. The results of Tables 1 and 2 show that the choice of gap 
measure is not the dominating feature of this analysis since the results are qualitatively 
similar to those of Orphanides. 
The estimated Taylor rule obtained using 1994q4 data with no interest rate smoothing 
and contemporaneous inflation and gap measures used as regressors takes the form14 
rt = —0.091 ± 1.7657rt + 0.583 T+4Xt ± 
(0.541) (1158) (0.078) 
t = 1987q1 — T, T = 1993q4, 
T12 = 0.947, SEE = 0.535, LL= —20.613, SC(1) = 10.608 
matching closely the Taylor rule of (2.1). Table 1 shows the corresponding partial adjust-
ment Taylor rules estimated for policy horizons ranging from i = —1 (backward-looking) 
to i = 4 (four quarters ahead) all based on the 1994q4 vintage of data. The column headed i 
= 0 provides a straight point of comparison with the model in (3.6). This demonstrates the 
empirical importance of including the lagged dependent variable to deal with residual serial 
correlation in (3.6) and to distinguish between the impact responses of interest rates and 
the long-run responses (with the impact effect (1 — p)-y, = 0.613 and the long run effect -
y„ = 1.442 for inflation, for example). The other columns of Table 1 show the sensitivity 
of the results to the inclusion of inflation and gap measures at the different policy horizons 
i = —1, .., 4. As in Orphanides (2001), the estimated coefficient on inflation gets larger and 
the estimated coefficient on the gap falls as longer policy horizons 
14See the footnote to Table 1 for an explanation of diagnostic statistics. 
[12] 
are considered. For example, the estimated long-run coefficient on inflation is actually 
negative for i = —1, although statistically insignificantly different to zero, but rises to a 
statistically-significant value of 4.018 for i = 4. It is also worth noting at this point the 
sensitivity of the estimated long-run responses to the estimated value of p: the precision of 
the estimated long-run response declines rapidly as p approaches unity so that, for 
example, the standard errors of the estimated long run inflation and output gap responses 
are very high in column (1), where p = .894, compared to the remaining columns where p 
takes values of 0.8 or below. For this reason, in much of what follows, we report also the 
'medium run' inflation and output gap response observed over a six quarter period, denoted 
ry"R and ryx"R, which provides a more precisely estimated indication of the interest rate 
response over the medium term even in models with very high degrees of interest rate 
smoothing.
15
 
Table 2 shows the corresponding results where the real-time output gap measure is 
employed. The extent of interest rate smoothing is typically estimated to be larger here 
than in Table 1 and the inflation and gap coefficients are typically smaller. All of the 
coefficients are more precisely estimated in Table 2 compared to Table 1, the fit of the 
equations, reflected by the standard errors and R
2
 statistics, are generally improved and the 
problems of residual serial correlation observed in Table 1 are resolved in Table 2. The 
results obtained using real-time data are more satisfactory in a statistical sense then but, 
more importantly, they are quite different from those obtained using the end-of sample 
data in some columns, confirming Orphanides' (2001) point on the importance of using 
real-time data in the study of Taylor rules. 
Focusing on the results in Table 2, we note that there is more consistency in parameter 
estimates across the policy horizons than in Table 1, particularly for the long-run 
coefficients. There remain some considerable differences in the short-run coefficients and 
implicit dynamics though, illustrating the specification uncertainty discussed in the pre-
vious section. However, it is straightforward to provide a meta Taylor rule for interest 
rate determination during this period by averaging across the separate models of Table 2. 
Specifically, a reasonable set of weights for the six models, denoted M i , i = —1, .., 4, to 
1550, for example, y7R = 7,E6„0 ps 
[13] 
reflect the dependence on the policy horizon, might be given by 
RSSi-
1
 
 where RSSi = 93q4 ; „ so that the weight is (inversely) proportionate to the sum 
t=87q1 
of squared residuals for the individual regressions. For Table 2, this would give weights of 
0.1238, 0.1466, 0.1786, 0.1912, 0.1644 and 0.1954 for models M_1 to M4 respectively, 
reflecting the relatively good performance of the longer-horizon regressions. A summary 
of the model-averaged results can then be written in the form of a Taylor rule 
rt = 0.802rt_i + (1 — 0.802) (-6.701 + 3.6217rat + 0.727 txat) + -eat/ (3.6) 
(0.045) (1.597) (0.439) (0.203) 
t = 1987q1 — T, T = 1993q4, 
where the constructed coefficients on the lagged interest rate, inflation and gap variables 
are simply the weighted averages of the corresponding coefficients from the individual 
models, and where the rat and xat are notional variables denoting the inflation and gap 
pressures averaged across the various policy horizons. The standard errors of the con-
structed coefficients in (3.6) are readily calculated using the formulae in Lee et al. (1990), 
taking the weights for each model as fixed.16 
The Taylor rule of (3.6) accommodates the model uncertainty raised by the ambiguity 
on the policy-horizon used by decision-makers as well as the parameter and stochastic 
uncertainty that is more usual in estimated Taylor rule models. It shows that, for Taylor's 
sample period at least, the parameters are broadly consistent with the sort of policy rule 
advocated by Taylor, with a reasonably high degree of smoothing but with positive and 
statistically-significant feedback from inflation and the gap to the interest rate with 
coefficients 3.621 and 0.727 over the long run. 
16Writing model Mi : rt = zitOt+uit for i = 1, ..m, and taking weights w$ as fixed, the covariance matrix 
of Oa = is given by Ein:ji tutwi cov(k, ) where cov(lit, Oj ) = (z itztt)-iz'itzj t (ziozit )-1 
and efr.j = under the assumptions on the error structure described in Lee et al. (1990). Also, since 
rt = 0aZit (Oi 0a)Zit uit in model i, averaging across i gives rt = Bazar +vt, where zat = n-1 Ei zit and vt =7/ I Ei— 
0a)zi, + uit). Hence Oa is the estimated responsiveness of rt to zat assuming the 
Ot and zit are distributed independently across i so E(zatut) = 0. 
[14] 
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3.2 Recursive Estimation of Taylor Rules, 1978q4 — 2008q4 
We now turn to the main empirical exercise of the paper, broadening the analysis beyond 
the Taylor sample to use the data for the whole period 1969q1 — 2008q4. The beginning 
of the sample period is constrained by the availability of direct measures of expectations: 
expectations of output and inflation are available from the SPF at the one-, two-, three-
and four-quarter ahead forecast horizon only from 1968q4. In the first instance, the set of 
models considered is exactly that described by (2.2), using (2.4) and (2.5) to construct 
model weights.' To ensure sufficient degrees of freedom in estimating our Taylor rules, 
we assume that regimes last a minimum of 4 years (i.e. jmin = 16). We also assume 
regimes do not last longer then 10 years (i.e. jr„,, = 40) although, in the event, models of 
this duration get very small or zero weight. Our choice of j r„,, is innocuous in this sense, 
although it does constrain the estimation period for the meta Taylor rule to run from 
1978q4 — 2008q4. This issue is considered further in the extended analysis below. 
Given our setup, the first set of 150 Taylor rules that were estimated relate to the 
sample window of 40 observations from 1969q1 — 1978q4, estimating six rules over the 
whole period with i = —1, ..., 4, then six over the period 1969q2 — 1978q4, and so on, 
finishing with six models estimated over 1975q1 — 1978q4. For this initial period, we 
assume equal weights across all 150 models. A second set of 150 rules was then estimated 
relating to the 40 observations from 1969q2 — 1979q1. Weights were calculated for each 
of these models based on the weights for the models in the previous period but updated 
according to their ability to explain the final observation in 1979q1 as in (2.5). Here we 
assume a value for the break probability of a = 6/163 = 0.037. This was based on a series of 
tests (one-step-ahead predictive failure tests, CUSUM tests, etc.) applied to a Taylor rule 
estimated (using contemporaneous inflation and gaps) over the 163 observations of our full 
sample all of which suggested the presence of 5 or 6 breaks when working at the 5% level 
of significance.
18
 This procedure was then repeated as we moved recursively 
17Unstable estimated rules, in which /
-
3,37
,
 exceeds unity, were excluded from the meta rule and replaced by 
models explaining Art; in other words, PBjT was capped at unity. This only impacts on results up to 1981q2. 
Before this time, the proportion of capped models averaged around 30%, but very few unstable 
models were obtained afterwards. 
18Working at the 1% or 10% level of signifcance, the tests suggested as few as 4 or as many as 10 breaks  
[15] 
through the dataset. 
Figures 2-6 summarise the results of estimating the meta Taylor rule in this way, with 
the vertical lines denoting the start of the terms of office of Paul Volcker (1979q3), Alan 
Greenspan (1987q3), and Ben Bernanke (2006q1) as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. 
Figure 2 plots the probability-weighted average sample length across the 150 models at 
4  4 0  
each point in time, IT = E E wiiT x j, while Figure 3 plots the probability-weighted 
j=16 
4  4 0  
average policy horizon, iT = E E W T x i, to provide a sense of the relative impor-i=-
1j=16 
tance of the 150 alternative models in each period. The corresponding confidence bands 
are plotted to show the precision of the estimated statistics and are obtained through 
stochastic simulation.19 Figures 4-6 show the probability-weighted averages of the partial 
adjustment coefficients, TT, and the inflation and output gap elasticities over the medium 
run, 7/1,1TR and 7YTR 
7 . 
3.2.1 Regimes and policy horizons 
Figure 2 suggests that policy over the period can be usefully grouped into four broad 
phases: the Volcker/early-Greenspan phase (1979q4-1993q4); the mid-Greenspan phase 
(1994q1-1999q2); the late-Greenspan phase (1999q3-2005q4); and the (pre-zero-lower-
bound) Bernanke phase (2006q1-2008q4). The first phase starts at the beginning of 
Volcker's term of office where the probability-weighted average sample length drops to a 
very low level indicating that monetary policy at that time was implemented very differently 
than previously. This coincides with the well-publicised move in October 1979 by 
respectively. The meta rules obtained with corresponding values fora are qualitatively unchanged from 
those reported in what follows, although the average duration of regimes grows a little more (less) rapidly 
with A = 4/163 (10/163). 
19Specifically, the estimated meta Taylor rule describes a data generating process for interest rates for 
each point in the sample given the history of inflation and the output gap and based on estimates of the 
150 individual models and of the weights and transition probabilities. This data generating process was 
used to provide 10000 alternative simulated "histories" for interest rates. For each simulated series, the 
procedure described to estimate the meta Taylor rule was implemented and distributions of average sample 
lengths and average policy horizons obtained. The confidence intervals illustrate the range covered by two 
standard deviations of these distributions. 
[16] 
the Federal Reserve to reorientate policy towards price stability by targeting non-borrowed 
reserves to control monetary growth instead of the federal funds rate (see Lindsey, Or-
phanides, and Rasche, 2005). The average sample length rises only slowly throughout the 
early 1980s, reflecting the ongoing challenges in targeting non-borrowed reserves instead 
of the federal funds rate, which was restored as the primary policy instrument by 1982 (see 
Axilrod, 2005).20 
The protracted rise in the probability-weighted average sample length to the end of 
1993, evident in Figure 2, implies some continuity in policy regime that included the rest 
of the Volcker years, but especially took hold in the early years of the Greenspan years. 
The continuity appears to end in 1994 when successive rises in the interest rate, and the 
Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) decision to announce its policy actions 
immediately upon making them, herald the beginning of the mid-Greenspan phase. The 
rise in average sample length over the subsequent five years implies a further period of 
policy stability. But the drop in sample length, and the start of the late-Greenspan phase, 
in 1999q3 also coincides with an important change in policy operation as the FOMC 
started releasing press statements including 'intended federal funds rate' and 'policy bias' 
from May 1999, having including a numeric value of the "intended federal funds rate" in 
each policy directive since August 1997. (See Poole, Rasche, and Thornton, 2002, for a 
thorough discussion of changes in policy operations over this time). 
The decline in the probability-weighted average sample length observed in Figure 2 
around the beginning of Bernanke's term of office corresponds with a fourth phase of 
policy. The especially sharp drop in August 2007 coincides with the Federal Reserve's 
change of discount window policies in order to "promote the restoration of orderly 
conditions in financial markets" (see August 17, 2007 press release of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors). 
20The fact that the probability-weighted average sample length never reaches the upper bound of 40 
quarters confirms that there is genuine model averaging in the sense of non-trivial weights distributed 
across multiple models. If one model were to have dominated, the average sample length should have 
increased to the upper bound as the sample period progressed. The result also directly suggests that that 
our particular choice of 40 quarters for the upper bound on a policy regime is sufficiently large when 
considering U.S. monetary policy for this sample period. 
[17] 
The evolution of policy within and across phases reflects changes in the responsiveness 
of interest rates to inflation and business cycle fluctuations, sometimes occurring abruptly 
and sometimes more gradually, that we discuss in detail below. But the flexibility of the 
meta-modelling approach also allows us to capture changes over time in decision-makers' 
policy horizons. Specifically, Figure 3 indicates that the policy horizon was generally 
forward-looking, with the average sample horizon ranging between one and two periods 
ahead when considered over the whole sample period. However, the estimation of the 
policy horizon varies considerably over the sample and, in particular, there is evidence that 
the policy horizon shortens during times of recession. This is apparent as the troughs in the 
probability-weighted policy horizon occur in 1980q3, 1982q3, 1991q3, 2000q4 and 
2008q4, which correspond closely to the troughs in activity in the five recessions 
identified by the NBER during this period. This ability of the meta-modelling approach to 
capture changes in the policy horizon is a major advantage of it over a standard model -
based approach, even when considering models that are flexible enough to capture time-
varying parameters. 
3.2.2 Smoothing, inflation and gap effects  
Figures 4-6 show the probability-weighted averages pT, 
,-
ilrviTR and -7
-
Y to provide further 
insights into the nature of changing policy regimes implied by Figure 2. The bands on these 
diagrams are 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors obtained analytically taking 
the weights as given and using the approach of Lee et al (1990) although bands obtained 
through simulation were qualitatively similar. The "Volcker/early-Greenspan" phase starts 
with a high, albeit imprecisely estimated, coefficient on inflation which remains high, and 
indeed slowly rises, throughout the period to peak at 3.30 in 1993q4.
21
 The phase is also 
characterised by increasingly smooth interest rate decisions and a growing influence from the 
output gap measure. The latter has a low and statistically insignificant influence through to the 
late eighties but begins to show significantly during the 
21The imprecision in the early years is associated with the instability of estimated rules, and their 
replacement with models explaining Ar t, during this time. This is as might be expected while non-
borrowed reserves were targeted rather than the federal funds rate itself.  
[18] 
recessionary period of 1990/1991 and stays at the new level of around 0.5 to 1993.  
The second, "mid-Greenspan", phase starting at the beginning of 1994 reflects a shift 
to a policy to preempt inflation. (See Goodfriend, 2003, for discussion). Policy continues 
to involve strong responses to inflation, but shows a marked shift of focus towards the 
output gap with its coefficient doubling in size over this phase. This was a period when 
the output gap became positive for the first time after the early nineties recession and 
remained high throughout the boom years to mid-1999. The increasing influence of the 
output gap influence will have kept interest rates higher than they would have been if 
earlier versions of the rule had been implemented and reflects a desire to manage the 
growth in demand and to avoid overheating. 
The third, "late-Greenspan", phase running 19990 — 2005q4 saw the gap continuing 
to exert a relatively high level of influence on policy, but introduced a more agile re-
sponsiveness as evidenced by a noticeable reduction in the partial adjustment coefficient. 
Importantly, this period also saw the inflation coefficient falling and becoming insignif -
icantly different to zero during 2004. The decline in the response to inflation could be 
related to a worry at the time that, with rates having been lowered very rapidly through 
the recession of 2001, a strong reaction to expected inflation might actually trigger de-
flation and the federal funds rate might eventually hit the zero lower bound.
22
 In any 
case, the decline in the influence of inflation was reversed during the last quarters of 
Greenspan's term of office and through the first quarters of Bernanke's te rm to 2007q4, 
matched by a slight shift in emphasis away from the output gap. But these trends were 
halted completely by the financial crisis which appears to have shifted attention solely to 
the gap and eliminated the influence of inflation. 
This commentary illustrates the usefulness of the meta Taylor rule in providing a single 
framework with which to interpret monetary policy since the late seventies, at least prior to the 
fed funds rate hitting the zero lower bound. It captures the continuity and strong anti-
inflationary stance of the Volcker/early-Greenspan years; the fear of overheating in the mid-
Greenspan years; the easing on inflation during most of the late-Greenspan years; 
22See Alcidi et al. (2011) for a nonlinear Taylor rule that captures this period as a regime in which 
policymakers worry about the zero lower bound problem. 
[19] 
the re-assertion of anti-inflationary policies in the late-Greenspan and early-Bernanke 
years; and the dramatic impact of the financial crisis on policy. It accommodates the shifts 
to more myopic decision-making during periods of recession and changes in the extent to 
which the Fed chooses to smooth its policy responses. The meta rule is able to capture this 
complexity and these nuances in policy in a very straightforward way, without recourse to 
complex nonlinearities or strategies to deal with structural breaks because of the simplicity 
of the individual linear Taylor rules that underlie it and the flexibility of the model 
averaging framework. 
3.3 Extensions of  the Analysis  
The flexibility of meta rule approach can be further exploited to deal with two data limitations 
that were mentioned earlier and to extend the Taylor rule analysis. The first limitation 
concerns the estimation period which runs 19780 — 2008q4. The start date in 
1978q4 is defined by the start date of the sample, 1969q1, and by our use of j = 40 in 
(2.2) reflecting our wish to allow for Taylor rules that are unchanged for up to ten years (even 
if this turns out to be unlikely in practice). This approach insists on considering the same set 
of 150 potential models at each point. A more pragmatic approach might be to consider all 
150 models when data allows at 1978q4, but to allow for a maximum length of 39 
observations in 1978q3, 38 in 1978q2, and so on. If we continue to assume that we need at 
least 16 observations to be able to reliably estimate a Taylor rule, this means that we could 
extend our analysis to run from 1972q4 — 2008q4. Only six alternative models will be 
considered to explain interest rate determination in 1972q4, relating to the six policy 
horizons, and the meta model is initiated with equal weights on each of the six. The meta 
model will extend to consider 12 models in 1973q1, rising to 150 models by 1978q4 as 
uncertainty on sample length is introduced progressively and with the weights evolving as in 
(2.4) and (2.5) as before. 
The second data limitation discussed in the analysis above relates to the measure of the 
output gap and the fact that the Greenbook measure of the gap - which describes policy-
makers' stated views on the size of the gap in real time - is available publicly only for the 
period 1987q3 — 2004q4. One reaction to the absence of a complete run of data 
[20] 
is simply to use an alternative series, as we did above. But in reality, new sources of 
information do become available over time and it is interesting to see how the availability 
of a new data series might have impacted on monetary policy decisions in real-time. The 
model averaging approach is able to accommodate this sort of break by including in the 
meta rule an extra set of models that uses the new variable. So, here, an extra set of 6 
models that incorporate the Greenbook measure of the gap can be considered in 
explaining the interest rate decision in 1991q2, in addition to the 150 used previously, 
using the first sixteen observations of the new gap series in place of Taylor's linear trend-
based measure. The number of extra models increases to 12 in 1991q3 and grows to 150 
models by 1997q2 taking into account the uncertainty on sample length in these extra 
Greenbook gap models. At this point, the meta Taylor Rule includes as many models 
incorporating the Greenbook gap measure as models that incorporate the gap measure 
based on the linear trend. If the new information source becomes influential, then this 
would be reflected by a shift of weights towards these alternative models.' 
Figures 7-11 summarise the meta Taylor rule obtained to accommodate these two ex-
tensions. The estimates run from the earlier starting date of 1972q4 using just six models 
estimated on sixteen observations between 1969q1 — 1972q4 and using the estimated tran-
sition probabilities to build up to 150 models at 1978q4. The estimates also accommodate 
additional models that make use of the Greenbook/CBO output gap data from 1991q2. The 
extended estimates illustrate two further distinct monetary policy regimes associated with the 
Chairmanships of Arthur Burns to 1978q1 and William Miller 1978q2 — 1979q3. Both 
periods are characterised as having a high degree of inertia and in fact the number of models 
in which the partial adjustment coefficient piiT is capped at unity averages around 50% during 
these phases so that the meta rule incorporates many models effectively explaining Art. The 
responses to inflation and the output gap are estimated imprecisely, but there is little 
evidence of any feedback from inflation to interest rates during the 
23The policy-makers' gap measure is extended to the end of the sample by splicing the Greenbook series 
that is available upto 2004q4 with the GDP gap measures provided by the CBO. See Poole (2007) for a 
discussion of the properties of such a spliced series. The CBO figures for txt+i, i = —1, .., 4, are published 
biannually, in January and August, and the q2 and q4 figures are obtained through linear interpolation of 
the real time data. 
[21] 
Burns period, consistent with the much highlighted finding in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2000). Inflation becomes more significant for policy during the Miller term of office and 
the fall in the average sample length over this period reflects the re-direction of policy that 
was then pursued during the Volcker/early-Greenspan phase as identified in the previous 
subsections. 
Notably, the estimated meta rule in the extended analysis looks very similar to that 
described above for most of the remaining sample. This is despite the differences in the 
starting point of the analysis and the potential impact of a different set of estimated tran-
sition probabilities during the early part of the sample and despite the different measures of 
the gap used in the later part of the sample. As it turns out, the sum of the weights on the 
models including the Greenbook output gap measure are generally high, rising from zero 
when they are first introduced in 1991q2 to around 0.8 by 1995q4. The weights are more 
evenly distributed during the periods when the gap has less influence on interest rates 
(1998/99 and 2004 onwards) but they emphasise the Greenbook measure throughout 2000-
2004 (with an average weight of 0.77) when the influence of the gap on interest rates was at 
its greatest. In any case, the distinct phases of policy discussed in the previous subsections 
are again recognisable in the data, with the same characterisation of policy regimes 
appearing to hold. The main change in interpretation relates to the timing of the re-assertion 
of the anti-inflationary policies of the late-Greenspan/early-Bernanke years which shows a 
more abrupt shift to an aggressively anti-inflation policy from 2005q2, not long before Ben 
Bernanke became Chairman. 
4  C o n c l u s i o n  
The use of model averaging is now widespread in the forecasting literature. The analysis of 
this paper demonstrates that the approach is also useful in the context of behavioural 
modelling and inference, providing an extremely flexible tool with which to model and 
characterise economic decision-making. The modelling approach can accommodate the 
uncertainties surrounding parameter estimates and random shocks to relationships as usual, 
but can also accommodate a modeler's uncertainty over the period during which relations hold 
and on the measures of variables used in decision-making. Our results show 
[22] 
that a 'meta' Taylor rule provides a flexible but compelling characterisation of monetary 
policy in the United States over the last forty years, with no single model of monetary 
policy dominating over the sample period or even at any point of time. The estimated rule 
highlights the lack of feedback from inflation to monetary policy during the early-to-mid 
seventies, the change in direction in the Miller years and the continuity in a policy-stance 
based on appropriately strong feedback from inflation and output gaps to policy during 
the Volcker/early-Greenspan years. The rule also provides evidence of changes in the 
emphasis on inflation and on the output gap in the rule subsequently, illustrating the 
successive effects of the fear of overheating, an easing on inflation, a re-assertion of anti-
inflationary policies and the dramatic impact of the financial crisis on policy. We also find 
that the Federal Reserve cares more about the immediate future than longer horizons 
during periods of recession. The meta-modelling approach draws these inferences out in a 
straightforward way that is more flexible than even highly complicated time-varying 
parameter models. 
As a caveat, our analysis is predicated on the Taylor-rule assumption that U.S. monetary 
policy responds to inflation and the output gap in a linear fashion and that we have 
accurately measured inflation and the gap as they are perceived by monetary policy 
authorities. To the extent that policymakers respond to other variables or respond nonlin-
early or have different perceptions about inflation and the gap, we may be overestimating 
the instability of policy regimes. For example, if the perceived output gap is strongly 
asymmetric, being more negative in recessions than positive in expansions, as found in 
Morley and Piger (2012), we would expect an increase in the estimated response to our 
linear measure of the output gap during recessions and a decrease in expansions, even if the 
true response to the gap is stable. Notably, the estimates in Figure 11 for the response to the 
output gap behave this way, at least in the 2000s. However, a full investigation of more 
complicated models and additional measures of inflation and the output gap are left for 
future research. Meanwhile, at least within the linear Taylor-rule framework and assuming 
our measures of inflation and the output gap do provide a reasonable approximation of the 
perceptions of policymakers, we find strong support for sizable and interesting changes in 
the systematic elements of U.S monetary policy over the last 40 years. 
[23] 
Table 1: Taylor Rules Estimated with 1994q4 Data: 1987q1 1993q4 
Horizon relative to decision period (in quarters) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
1.507 0.288 0.061 -0.881 -2.257 -3.276 
 (0.446) (0.326) (0.547) (0.545) (0.629) (0.574) 
-0.306 0.613 0.351 0.733 1.241 1.530 
 (0.281) (0.230) (0.224) (0.220) (0.256) (0.222) 
0.332 0.395 0.208 0.177 0.155 0.092 
 (0.103) (0.055) (0.073) (0.063) (0.056) (0.048) 
0.894 0.575 0.781 0.715 0.631 0.619 
 (0.144) (0.101) (0.088) (0.073) (0.071) (0.056)  
ryir -2.882 1.442 1.600 2.570 3.366 4.018 
 (3.673) (0.261) (0.723) (0.545) (0.430) (0.385) 
3.126 0.930 0.949 0.621 0.419 0.243 
 (3.478) (0.177) (0.358) (0.218) (0.150) (0.124)  
MR 
- 1 . 5 7 0  1 . 4 1 2  1 . 3 1 8  2 . 3 2 5  3 . 2 3 1  3 . 8 7 8  
(2.036) (0.279) (0.660) (0.491) (0.404) (0.351) 
MR 
1 . 7 0 2  0 . 9 1 1  0 . 7 8 2  0 . 5 6 2  0 . 4 0 2  0 . 2 3 4  
(0.400) (0.154) (0.241) (0.187) (0.141) (0.119) 
0 . 9 7 1  0 . 9 8 2  0 . 9 6 1  0 . 9 7 1  0 . 9 7 8  0 . 9 8 5  
S E E  0 . 3 8 4  0 . 3 0  0 . 4 4 7  0 . 3 8 4  0 . 3 3 6  0 . 2 8 1  
LL -10.31 -3.84 -14.43 -10.33 -6.69 -1.84 
S C ( 1 )  3 . 1 1  4 . 1 8  6 . 8 5  3 . 1 5 3  0 . 0 0  0 . 2 3  
[0.92] [0.96] [0.99] [0.92] [0.04] [0.37] 
The table presents least squares estimates of the regression equations 
Tt= Pr t-CF(1 )0)(-Y 0+7 7r7rt+i+7 xXt+i) for t = 1987q1, 1993q4 
based on information available in 1994q4 and using a linear trend to obtain a measure of the output gap. 
The columns correspond to different values for i. For forward-looking variants of the Taylor rule, survey 
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are used and the output gap is obtained as the 
difference between the relevant forward-looking forecast series and the corresponding forecast values of 
the linear trend. r is the squared multiple correlation coefficient, SEE the standard error of the 
regression. LL is the log likelihood value and SE(1) gives a LM test statistic of residual first order serial 
correlation. Standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values denoted [.]. 
[24] 
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Table 2: Taylor Rules Estimated with Real-Time Data: 1987q1 - 1993q4 
Horizon relative to decision period (in quarters) 
 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 
0.123 -0.377 -0.832 -1.367 -2.390 -3.360 
(0.317) (0.304) (0.280) (0.315) (0.541) (0.584) 
0.239 0.465 0.541 0.665 1.004 1.386 
(0.209) (0.183) (0.142) (0.150) (0.251) (0.272) 
0.172 0.179 0.157 0.132 0.097 0.048 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) 
0.860 0.824 0.835 0.833 0.781 0.707 
(0.079) (0.066) (0.050) (0.048) (0.067) (0.070) 
1.708 2.638 3.274 3.975 4.574 4.738 
(0.754) (0.481) (0.532) (0.614) (0.594) (0.435) 
1.227 1.018 0.952 0.790 0.440 0.165 
(0.526) (0.324) (0.283) (0.263) (0.214) (0.134) 
1.113 1.958 2.349 2.872 3.766 4.318 
(0.758) (0.485) (0.386) (0.386) (0.432) (0.314) 
0.799 0.756 0.683 0.571 0.363 0.150 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.117) (0.122) (0.139) (0.114) 
0.975 0.979 0.983 0.984 0.981 0.984 
0.355 0.326 0.295 0.285 0.308 0.282 
-8.54 -6.17 -3.41 -2.45 -4.563 -2.15 
1.48 0.53 0.34 0.024 0.00 0.08 
[0.78] [0.53] [0.44] [0.12] [0.05] [0.22] 
 
The table presents least squares estimates of the regression equations 
: rt= tort-I-F(1- P)(10-HY, trrt+i+11, txt+i) + alt, for t = 1987q1, 1993q4 
where the output gap is obtained by detrending a rolling sample of 40 quarters of data using the 
historical time series available during that quarter. The columns correspond to different values for i. 
For forward-looking variants of the Taylor rule, survey forecasts from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters are used. R2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient, SEE the standard error of the 
regression. LL is the log likelihood value and SE(1) gives a LM test statistic of residual first order 
serial correlation. Standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values denoted [.]. 
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Figure 5: Recursive Estimation of the Medium Run Inflation Coefficient 
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Figure 6: Recursive Estimation of the Medium Run Output Gap Coefficient 
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Figure 9: Recursive Estimation of the Partial Adjustment Coefficient with 
Expanded Model Space 
Figure 11: Recursive Estimation of the Medium Run Output Gap Coefficient with 
Expanded Model Space 
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Figure 10: Recursive Estimation of the Medium Run Inflation Coefficient with 
Expanded Model Space 
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